

This scholarly volume, with an admittedly pedantic style, does thoroughly discuss the epochal work in the philosophy of science written by Thomas S. Kuhn. The style is not, such as to prevent a non-specialist from grasping Hoyningen-Huene's exposition and critique. In fact, points are laboriously presented and Kuhn's positions, including his historical development, is presented clearly. The tome is thoroughly footnoted, contains an exhaustive bibliography and an index.

Kuhn's Foreword endorses this book as an aide in coming to understand his position on the philosophy of science and on the nature of scientific revolutions. Kuhn's philosophy of science's evolution over 30 years is presented with painstaking detail, but the discussion is kept on a very narrow focus. No attempt is made to consider the branching out of the influence of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in other disciplines. Even within the narrow focus, Kuhn's opposition, the position of Karl Popper, is not adequately addressed. Hoyningen-Huene also mostly avoids presenting examples from the history of science to clarify the abstract discussion of theoretical points. Despite acknowledging the wider philosophical issues provided by Kuhn, and sometimes discussed by Kuhn, almost no effort is made to place Kuhn's philosophical thoughts within the wider context of current philosophical discussion. Included in this weakness, is the mention of Kuhn's reference to Wittgenstein without exploring the completely congruent approach, in many respects, of both Wittgenstein and Kuhn to community of discourse relativism.

For one wishing to expand one's knowledge of Kuhn's thoughts, especially his changes since the epochal 1962 work, or wanting more detail on his concept of paradigm change, this volume will fill the bill. Discussion of the philosophical implications of Kuhn's work is not developed in this volume, and awaits a similarly thorough exposition and critique. The bibliography provides many avenues for furthering Kuhn research.

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