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PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE, Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science, translated by Alexander T. Levin with a foreword by Thomas S. Kuhn; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. Pp. 330. ISBN 0-226-35551-0, £30.50 (hardback), 0-226-35551-9, £12.75 (paperback).

Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions outlines and corrects Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, particularly as it was proposed in *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*. Hoyningen-Huene offers a systematic exposition of Kuhn's main concepts, beginning with a definition of his object of study and finishing with a definition of reality as understood by Kuhn, with all the well-known Kuhnian concepts such as normal science, paradigm, incommensurability and so on being given detailed analysis. Hoyningen-Huene also notes difficulties with Kuhn's work and proposes solutions.

Within these aims this is an impressive project. Hoyningen-Huene works systematically, even pedantically, through Kuhn's philosophy of science, identifying imprecision or illogicality and proposing reformulations. The reworking of Kuhn also carries Kuhn's approval as Hoyningen-Huene has submitted his proposals to Kuhn, discussed them with him and received an approving foreword from Kuhn. In essence, this book is a systematic exposition of Kuhn's philosophy of science which solves previously known problems with Kuhn's work.

While *Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions* is not for a beginner, discussion being couched at a high level of philosophical abstraction, it surveys Kuhn's thought clearly, identifies problems and proposes plausible solutions. If anyone is looking for an advanced exposition and 'correction' of Kuhn's thought then this book will fit the bill.

However, this praise raises the key problems with this book, which are twofold. First, who will be interested in reading it? The audience appears quite small; advanced, because the arguments are complex and abstract, philosophers of science who can be expected to know Kuhn's work already and so will be mainly interested in Hoyningen-Huene's corrections of Kuhn. The audience is therefore advanced philosophers of science who are currently concerned with problems raised by Kuhn's 1962 book. Anyone else, especially students, would be well-advised to read Kuhn himself.

Noting the age of Kuhn's work raises this book's second major problem; the absence in it of any discussion of philosophy, sociology or history of science of the last thirty years. There is no discussion of Kuhn's thought, before or after Hoyningen-Huene's corrections, in relation to any developments since Kuhn, which makes his discussion relevant to current science studies only by implication or extension from what this book contains.

When reading Hoyningen-Huene the constant question that occurred to me, even as I admired the attention to detail, is 'why?', why would anyone want to read it rather than either Kuhn in the original or current science studies. At its best *Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions* is a lucid account and correction of one of the most influential philosophers of science, at its worst it is an irrelevant exercise in scholasticism.

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